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"If something is not done. . ., the macaroni monopoly will be
in the hands of the universities. '
When a group of wealthy graduates donated the Mueller Maca-
roni Company to the New York University (N.Y.U.) Law School in
1948, the university persuaded a court to give Mueller's profits tax-
exempt status because N.Y.U. was a nonprofit entity.2 Two years
later, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to narrow this
exemption: Henceforth, only the "related" business ventures of non-
profits would be tax exempt.3
Very little money has been collected under this provision.4 In-
stead, it has channeled the "active" investments of nonprofits into
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1. Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 579-80 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Dingell), quotedin Note, The Macaroni Monopoly:
The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1280, 1281 n.10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Aacaroni Alonopoy].
2. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951); Note, The Maca-
roni MonopolP, supra note 1, at 1281. N.Y.U. also owned a leather company, a piston ring
factory, and a chinaware manufacturing operation. Other colleges and universities owned
enterprises manufacturing automobile parts, cotton gins, and food products, and operated an
airport, a street railway, a hydroelectric plant, and a radio station. See Kaplan, Intercollegiate
Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1432 (1980).
3. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, §§ 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906, 947-53, 957-59
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 502-514 (1976)). Several commentators have reviewed this law. See
Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption ofNonproft Organizationsfiom Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE
LJ. 299 (1976); Cooper, Trends in the Taxation of Unrelated Business Activity, 29 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 1999 (1971 ); Kaplan, supra note 2; Note, Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60
YALE LJ. 851 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Note, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950].
For a discussion of changes made in the treatment of nonprofit firms by the 1969 and 1976
tax law revisions, see Bittker & Rahdert, supra, at 316-30; Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1431.
4. See Webster, Effect of Business Activities on Exempt Organizations, 43 TAXES 777 (1965).
In the last six fiscal years the total tax collected was less than .05% of corporate income tax
collections. Total fiscal year collections were $24,970,000 in 1977, $27,470,000 in 1978,
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"related" areas. Universities, for example, are no longer in the pasta
business, but they continue to sell housing and meals, perform con-
tract research and testing, and operate publishing houses.5  Of
course, the meaning of "related" is not obvious and the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) and the courts have experienced predictable diffi-
culties settling on a definition.6 The unresolved issue of the law's
coverage will be of growing concern to nonprofits since current cuts
in marginal tax rates and in government subsidies will undoubtedly
induce many nonprofit firms to consider profitmaking activities as a
way to raise funds.7 As nonprofits try to enter new fields, such as
genetic engineering and cooperative research relationships with pri-
vate firms,8 Congress and the IRS will have to decide whether to
facilitate or impede these activites, placing new strains on a genera-
$24,970,000 in 1979, $27,920,000 in 1980, and $34,310,000 in 1981. Internal Revenue Serv-
ice, Data on Taxes Collected on Form 990T (unpublished IRS staff calculation).
5. Bromberg, Universiy Audits by IRS, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Feb. 1980, at 18
(newsletter).
6. Some of this confusion arises because the law seeks to tax "unrelated" business activ-
ity, see I.R.C. § 513(a) (1976), even though the legislative history speaks of "unfair" competi-
tion. See Kaplan, sufira note 2, at 1433-44. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b), T.D. 7392,
1976-1 C.B. 162, 168-69. Mansfield, Some Aspects of Taxation of Business Income of Exempt Organi-
zations, in 3 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SESs., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 2067 (House Comm. on Ways & Means Comm. Print 1959) [herein-
after cited as TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM]; Webster, supra note 4. For discussion and com-
mentary on these exercises in definition, see Cooper, supra note 3; Grant, Taxation of Exempt
Charitable Organization Engaging in Busines Activities, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 352 (1957); Green-
baum, Business Dealings 0 Charities, 14 INST. ON FED. TAX'N. 127 (1956); Webster, supra note
4.
7. The cuts will reduce tax incentives for individuals to donate money by decreasing the
value of the charitable deduction on the margin. This may well outweigh the "income effect"
of the tax cut, i.e., taxpayers have more money to spend and may contribute some of this
excess to charity. At the same time, government spending cuts will reduce nondonative
sources of income for nonprofits and decrease publicly funded alternatives to private largesse.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 attempts to compensate for its disincentives to
donate by means of an "above-the-line" charitable deduction for taxpayers who do not item-
ize their deductions. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 121, I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp.
1982).
8. See, e.g., N. BRODSKY, H. KAUFMAN &J. TOOKER, UNIVERSITY/INDUSTRY COOPER-
ATION (1980); Reinhold, Gover nent Scutinizes Lhk Between Genetics Indusig and Universities,
N.Y. TimesJune 16, 1981, at 16, col. 1;Industi4 Role in Academia, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1981,
at DI, col. 3. But see note 66 infra.
At present, "all income derived from research for federal or state goverments and, in the
case of a college, university or hospital, all income derived from research performed for any
person" is tax-exempt under I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(7)-(8). See Myers, Unrelated Business Income: A
Suddenly Exploive Issue, in N.Y. PRACaICING LAW INsTrrrE, SEvENTH BIENNIAL CONFER-
ENCE: TAX PLANNING FOR FOUNDATIONS, TAx-Ex ms' STATUS AND CHARITABLE CON-
TRIBUTIONS 223 (1978).
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tion-old policy.9
The particular problem of competition from nonprofits raises a
more general issue. A variety of tax-favored entities compete with
for-profit firms in a broad range of industries.10 When, if ever, will
"unfair" competition by tax-favored firms be a legitimate problem
for public policy? Congress's response to complaints of unfair compe-
tition has been inconsistent at best. The Internal Revenue Code has
all but eliminated the tax advantage of mutual and cooperative
banks and insurance companies,11 but agricultural cooperatives en-
joy a relatively favorable tax status.' 2 Utilities operated by state and
local governments are exempt from the corporate income tax, while
private regulated companies are not.
13
Instead of ad hoc responses to particular claims of unfair compe-
tition, we need a framework for analyzing the policy questions that
arise whenever a tax-favored firm competes with firms that pay the
corporate income tax. Two different claims, both based on the no-
tion of "horizontal equity" 4 are frequently confused in the policy
debate.1 5 The first approach compares firms within the same industry
9. I address only one of the public policies that differentiate between firms on the basis
of organizational form. For example, nonprofits obtain lower postal rates, exemption from
property taxes, and favorable treatment on government contracts. See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNMENT COMPETITION: A THREAT TO SMALL BUSINESS 74-79
(1980) (report of the advocacy task group on government competition with small business).
10. Recent data from the Census Bureau's 1977 Census of Service Industries indicate
the extent to which taxable and tax-exempt firms coexist in various service industries. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1977 CENSUS OF SERVICE INDUS-
TRIES: OTHER SERVICE INDUSTRIES 53-1-2, 53-1-3 (1981) (Geographic Area Series, No.
SC77-A-53, pt. 1 (1981)) (Table 1, Summary Statistics for the United States: 1977) (survey-
ing the major service industries where competition occurs, but omitting competition between
subsidiary organizations, such as university book stores or cafeterias, and for-profit firms).
11. In the savings and loan and insurance industries, Congress has responded to com-
plaints of "unfair" competition by equalizing the tax treatment of mutual and for-profit com-
panies. See Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 13, 60 (1972).
12. The actual income tax laws facing cooperatives are complicated, but the basic im-
plication of their special treatment is that they face lower tax rates on earnings than corpora-
tions. For a summary of the law, see M. ABRAHAMSEN, COOPERATIVE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
225-41 (1976). Cooperatives' lower tax liabilities arise mainly because the bulk of patronage
dividends paid to members are not taxable to the cooperative. Agricultural cooperatives also
have access to low-cost loans from special banks and from members' contributions. They are,
however, unable to raise capital through public issues of common stock.
13. See Ely, Federal Taxation ofIncome ofStates andI Political Subdivisions, in 3 TAx REVISION
COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 2091; Gilpin, Business Income of Exempt Organizations-Tax Equal-
iration--Ekctric Utility Service Organizations, in 3 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at
2077.
14. Horizontal equity is the principle that taxes should be equal for entities in equal
positions. See A. ATINSON &J. STIGLrrz, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 353-56 (1980).
15. A third claim should be kept separate because it deals with efficiency, not fairness.
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and asserts that it is unfair for the tax system to favor one competitor
over another.' 6 The second approach compares for-profits across dif-
ferent industries-those with and those without tax-favored firms.
Here it is said to be "unfair" for some firms to compete with tax-
favored organizations when for-profit corporations in other industries
compete only with taxable firms.
The first approach to horizontal equity makes the claim, for ex-
ample, that N.Y.U. should pay taxes on its Mueller pasta business
simply because the Ronzoni Company pays taxes on its macaroni
profits. This view assumes that the fairness of tax policy should be
assessed by comparing the income statements of the competing com-
panies. But it is obvious that the ultimate impact of N.Y.U.'s pasta
activities was not felt by the Ronzoni Company but by the human
beings associated with it as investors, workers, and consumers. So-
phisticated students of tax policy routinely incorporate this point in
their assessments of fairness. Rather than speaking of fairness to cor-
porate entities, they have pierced the organizational veil to consider
the interests of human beings. 17 Under this "person-oriented" per-
spective, the first fairness claim collapses. The different tax treat-
ment of competing organizational forms does not imply that
Ronzoni and N.Y.U. would charge different prices for their macaroni
or pay different wages to their workers. It implies only that N.Y.U.
would keep a larger share of Mueller's profits than would Ronzoni's
owners. Once we look beyond the organization, this difference does
not seem to violate principles of horizontal equity: Why must a fair
tax code treat students and scholars who are the beneficiaries of
Mueller's profits as if they were "equal to" Ronzoni's investors?
The second approach to horizontal equity gives a more meaning-
ful interpretation to the complaints of Ronzoni's investors and will
be used in the analysis that follows. Under this view, Ronzoni inves-
tors would argue that the relevant horizontal comparison is with in-
vestors in industries which do not face competition from tax-favored
Thus when for-profits are harmed as a result of the superior efficiency of tax-favored firms,
the claim that the tax law gives the successful firms their competitive advantage is obviously
unjustified. Rather than restrict this form of "unfair competition," the entry of efficient non-
profits ought to be encouraged. For an analysis of this claim, see Hansmann, The Rationa/efor
Exempting Nonprofit Organizatotsfiom Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE LJ. 54 (1981). In such
markets as dayeare, hospitals, and education, for-profits may only be able to survive if they
differentiate their product from that provided by nonprofits.
16. Klein, supra note 11, at 58 ("if the tax system favors one competitor over another
without good reason, the unfavored competitor can properly claim injustice").
17. See, e.g., A. ATKiNSON &J. STIGLrrz, supra note 14, at 160-226; Warren, The Relation
and Integration o(Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REv. 717 (1981).
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firms. After all, at an earlier point in time, owners of shares in pasta-
making companies could have chosen to invest in other businesses
instead. In the absence of a tax on unrelated business activities,
N.Y.U.'s entry into the pasta business would mean that investors who
at one time were similarly situated are now earning different returns.
This, at least, raises the possibility of a claim of horizontal inequity:
If pasta investors are harmed, why should they be called on to bear a
greater share than others of. the social costs of tax favoritism to
nonprofits?
Legally trained commentators have avoided this normative ques-
tion by doing some inadequate positive economics. They have ar-
gued that firms that compete with nonprofits are not generally worse
off than those that compete only with for-profits."8 If this is true, the
unfairness issue simply does not arise. I will demonstrate that previ-
ous analysts have dismissed the issue of "unfair" competition too
quickly. While I agree that nofiprofits are no more likely to engage
in predatory pricing than for-profits, 9 I will show that for-profit in-
vestors may be injured even when predation does not occur. For-
profit investors' claims of injury are neither obviously correct nor pa-
tently false. Their validity depends both on one's definition of fair-
ness and on a set of factual issues including the market structure of
the industry in question, the information available to firms before
they enter, the costs of leaving the industry, and the efficiency of cap-
ital markets. Both the firms that complain of injury and the legal
scholars who minimize the problem of unfair competition have over-
simplified the issue and missed critically important features of the
problem.
The economic analysis in Part I proceeds in three stages. First, I
discuss competition between taxable and tax-exempt firms in a com-
petitive economy where entrants correctly foresee the presence of tax-
exempt competitors. Next, I drop the assumption of perfect foresight
and show how for-profit firms will be affected by the tax and organi-
18. See Note, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by Tax-Exempt Organizations, 32 U.
CHI. L. REv. 581, 591-92 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preventing Untaxed Business]. See
alro, Klein supra note 11, at 61-68; Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 1, at 1281 n.1 1;
Note, Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 3, at 876.
19. Kaplan, sura note 2, at 1465-66; Klein, supra note 11, at 65-66; Note, Colleges, Chari-
ties and the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 3, at 876. In an oligopolistic market prices may be
lower if one of the competitors is nonprofit. See notes 45-54 infa and accompanying text.
This price is not predatory in the usual sense of a seller who "cuts price below the level of its
rivals' costs and perhaps also its own costs for protracted periods, until the rivals either close
down operations altogether or sell out on favorable terms." F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MAR-
KET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 335 (2d ed. 1980).
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zational status of nonprofits in the case of unanticipated competition.
To conclude Part I, I assume that the economy is imperfectly com-
petitive, so that nonprofits compete with for-profits in an oligopolistic
setting. After specifying in Part I the market conditions under which
for-profit investors'may be harmed, Part II turns to the normative
question. I suggest that the distinctions made in the positive eco-
nomic analysis will enlighten, if not fully resolve, the problems of
identifying "unfair competition." The analysis demonstrates that the
present tax on nonprofits' "unrelated" business income is exactly the
wrong way to deal with the problem, generating more "unfairness"
than it has prevented. While an economically sophisticated defini-
tion of unfairness is possible, its application involves subtle empirical
issues-so subtle that they may be beyond the administrative capaci-
ties of the IRS. As a consequence, outright repeal of the tax on unre-
lated business activities seems like the best policy response.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE
The policy debate has tended to view "unfair competition" in
black-and-white terms. Either "unfairness" is the inevitable result of
nonprofit entry, as for-profit firms and their congressional allies
claim, or it almost never happens-as legal scholars assert.20 If, how-
20. For a summary of the arguments on both sides, see 1 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM,
supra note 6, at 3. The most extended discussion by a legal scholar is in Klein, supra note 11.
See also Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3; Kaplan, supra note 2; Note, The Macaroni Monopot'y,
supra note 1; Note, Colleger, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 3.
Spiro discusses several recent cases where for-profits claimed to suffer from "unfair" com-
petition because of nonprofits' favorable tax status. See T. Spiro, "Unfair Competition" Be-
tween Taxable and Tax-Exempt Organizations: Three Case Studies (Supervised Analytic
Writing, Yale University 1979). He looks at an unsuccessful travel industry challenge to the
travel activities of the American Jewish .Congress and other tax-exempt organizations, Am.
Soc'y of Travel Agents v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947
(1978). After losing in the courts, the travel industry attempted to influence IRS revenue
rulings directly. A recent ruling was more favorable to the industry. See Rev. Rul. 78-43,
1978-1 C.B. 164 (stating that the University of North Carolina Alumni Association's travel-
income was "unrelated," and hence taxable).
Spiro's second case involves the office products industry, where "sheltered workshops" for
the handicapped compete with for-profit firms. The for-profits' trade association, the Office
Products Manufacturing Association (OPMA), claimed unfair competition, but a Treasury
Revenue Ruling upheld the tax exemption of sheltered workshops. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.513-1(d)(4)(ii) (1967). Unlike the travel agents, OPMA has brought no court challenges
and has concentrated on the important nontax advantages of sheltered workshops. See T.
Spiro, supra.
A third example involves a court challenge brought by a taxable, commercial laboratory
against a nonprofit corporation that promotes "manufactures, and the mechanic and useful
arts." Structure Probe, Inc. v. Franklin Inst., 450 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Pa. 1978), a 'd, 595
F.2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1979). Structure Probe alleged that the Franklin Institute violated the
1022 [Vol. 34:1017
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ever, we try to locate the debate within a framework emphasizing
market structure and imperfect information, the claims made on
both sides seem overly broad.
For-profit firms advance two arguments to justify protection
against nonprofit competition. First, they claim that nonprofits will
cut prices below the prices that taxable firms could charge. Econom-
ically oriented legal commentators have generally dismissed the price
cutting claim by arguing that if price cutting were profitable, for-
profit competitors would do it too.2 ' But this argument ignores the
possibility that nonprofits can affect market prices without resorting
to overtly predatory behavior. Even in a competitive market where
firms are too small to affect market prices individually, the entry of
nonprofits could lower prices by shifting the overall industry supply
curve. Nonprofits may be willing to enter an industry even when
marginal for-profit firms are just breaking even. If for-profits cannot
easily exit, supply will be larger, returns will be smaller, and price
will be lower than in an industry without nonprofit firms. And in an
oligopolistic industry, where individual firms can affect price levels,
equilibrium prices might be lower when one of the major competitors
is tax-exempt even though no one ever sets prices below cost.22
Second, for-profits argue that nonprofits will grow more quickly
than for-profits and be less vulnerable to bankruptcy because they
accumulate earnings faster.23 While these claims have been accepted
by most legal scholars,24 their importance depends critically on the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), in its sale of scanning electron microscope (SEM) services.
The suit also claimed that the Institute's sale of SEM services violated its nonprofit charter.
The court rejected both claims. 450 F. Supp. at 1288, 1290.
21. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1466; Klein, supra note 11, at 65-66; Note, Colleges,
Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 3, at 876.
22. Price theory demonstrates that marginal firms will be earning a competitive rate of
return on their investment. See note 28 infra and accompanying text. Readers unfamiliar
with basic price theory should consult a basic microeconomics text such as J. HIRSHLEIFER,
PRics THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1980).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 579-80 (1950) ("The tax-free status of
these. . . organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while
their competitors can expand onlo with profits remaining after taxes."); Klein, supra note 11,
at 255. There is a strong implication that firms do not have access to outside financing. See
generally U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMiNSTRATION, supira note 9.
24. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1466. One student commentator argues that a tax-
exempt business can accumulate a larger surplus than a taxable business, which may help it
to weather lean years and to expand. See Note, Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950,
supra note 3, at 876. Another argues that
the fast accumulation of capital made possible by tax-free profits is an advantage in
any field. Where the market is expanding, the exempt enterprise will have a greater
surplus to invest in production and distribution facilities, and, in anticipation of
May 1982] 1023
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efficiency of capital markets. The more efficiently the capital market
operates, the less important are retained earnings. If, however, lend-
ers have difficulty evaluating a firm's investments, the firm may pre-
fer to exploit internal sources of funds, and firms with high levels of
retained earnings have an advantage.25
To assess the validity of the price cutting and retained earnings
arguments, and thereby move from critique to contribution, requires
a more systematic treatment that models the important market struc-
tures separately. To focus on the links among tax status, capital
structure, and profitability, I will stylize the differences between
firms in an extreme way. There are only two types of firms: for-profit
corporations subject to the corporate income tax and nonprofit, tax-
exempt corporations that can issue no equity and must raise capital
through borrowing or gifts.26 Nonprofit firms engage in tax-exempt
business activity to provide funds to subsidize their primary activi-
ties. Therefore they want to maximize expected profits. I shall also
assume that nonprofit firms are, on the average, as efficient as for-
profits. Firms need not be identical, but any differences in costs or
productivity are not systematically related to organizational form.
The production of services by nonprofits is not complicated by ideo-
logical commitments or ineffective management.2 7 Only tax and cap-
higher net profits, can compete more effectively for supplies, capital assets, ind out-
side financing. Even in an industry with inelastic demand the untaxed business will
be able to invest in improvements at a faster rate than its competitors.
Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 1, at 1282. But see Klein, supra note 11, at 66-67
(denying the special importance of retained earnings); Note, Preventing Untaxed Business, supra
note 18, at 592 (same).
25. I assume here that profit-maximizing organizations will invest in the activities ex-
pected to yield the highest return. With perfect information and identical risk preferences,
banks and firms would rank investment opportunities in the same way. Firms would be indif-
ferent between borrowing from a bank or using their own funds, and borrowers could obtain
funds either from banks or from firms lacking profitable investments within their own com-
pany. Asymmetric information changes this result. Banks and other lenders may have
trouble monitoring a firm's use of investment funds. Therefore, they will charge an interest
rate that takes account of this risk, and they may ration credit to the firm. In that case,
retained earnings will be a cheaper source of funds for a firm than bank debt even taking into
account "opportunity cost"--the return which the funds could earn if invested outside the
firm.
26. Although I do not explicitly discuss the idiosyncracies of cooperatives, mutuals, or
government corporations, much of the basic analysis can be applied to these organizations
with a suitable modification of the assumptions concerning tax status and capital constraints.
27. I make this assumption not because it is necessarily realistic, but because it permits
me to focus on the difference in tax treatment. Bittker and Rahdert suggest that "the business
practices of charity-owned enterprises [may be] characterized more by caution than bold-
ness." Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 320. Their claim is, however, an empirical assertion
that has not been supported by systematic investigation. See D. Young, If Not For-Profit, For
1024
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ital structure differences are important.
A. Anticipated Competition from Nonproflts
If an industry were perfectly competitive with easy entry and exit
of firms, complaints of "unfair competition" would always be invalid.
A for-profit firm that was losing money in competition with a non-
profit would simply leave that industry and earn the competitive rate
of return elsewhere.28
But in many situations, human and physical capital are not fun-
gible, and exit is therefore costly. 29 Even when exit is difficult, how-
ever, there is no reason to assume automatically that for-profit firms
are suffering from "unfair" competition from nonprofits. In particu-
lar, whenever for-profits could reasonably have expected nonprofit
competition at the time of their initial commitment to the industry,
they would have included that fact in their calculations of expected
returns and made their decision to invest accordingly. They would
not 'have invested unless they expected to do at least as well there as
in alternative investments." Therefore, in the case of anticipated
What? A Behaviorial Theory of the Non-Profit Sector Based on Entrepreneurship (1981)
(unpublished manuscript, Yale University Program on Non-Profit Organizations) (case stud-
ies of nonprofit entrepreneurship).
28. In equilibrium in a competitive industry marginal firms earn zero "economic" prof-
its and positive accounting profits. Their accounting profits include both a return to the
equity capital invested in the firm, reflecting the opportunity cost of that capital, and the
value of the entrepreneurs' time. Economic profits are only positive when a firm's return
exceeds what owners could earn by withdrawing their money and time and investing them
elsewhere in the competitive economy. On the distinction between economic and accounting
profits, see J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 22, at 265. Bankruptcy costs would be small since they
include only the administrative costs of going through the procedure. See Warner, Bankrupty
Costs, Absolute Pnorty and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 239 (1977) (estimates
of the relatively small administrative costs of railroad bankruptcies).
29. Capital is malleable before it is put in place, but once embodied in equipment it
cannot be changed easily. A firm has many choices before it has embraced a particular in-
vestment strategy. After the plant and machinery are purchased, the firm's choices are lim-
ited by the resale market for specialized capital. See R. ALLEN, MACRO-ECONOMIC THEORY:
A MATHEMATICAL TREATMENT 256 (1967).
30. If all such competition were anticipated by for-profit investors, then the ratio of
taxable to tax-exempt capital in the economy as a whole might affect overall rates of return,
but taxable firms in direct competition with tax-exempt firms would be at no special disadvan-
tage.
Harberger argues that in a competitive economy, a tax on corporate profits will, in the
long run, lower overall returns to capital irrespective of where the capital is invested.
Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tar, 70 J. POL. EcoN. 215 (1962). See
McLure, General Equilibrium Incidence Analsi. The Harberger model after ten years, 4 J. PUB.
EcoN. 125 (1975), for an assessment of Harberger's contribution and a summary and critique
of the research spawned by Harberger's original article.
In contrast to Harberger, Stiglitz contends that in the absence of bankruptcy risks the
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competition, no claims of unfairness can be substantiated even if exit
is difficult. This argument is independent of any particular model of
nonprofit behavior. So long as the entry and subsequent behavior of
nonprofits were anticipated, taxable firms could have no grounds for
complaint.
The real world, however, frequently does not conform to the
stringent conditions imposed here. The next section examines the
fairness claims that might arise if exit is costly and if competition
from nonprofits is unanticipated.
B. Unanticipated Competition
Competitive returns represent the opportunity cost of money and
time invested in the firm. If entrepreneurs and investors had chosen
not to establish a particular firm, they could have invested elsewhere
at competitive rates. If a firm earns less than this competitive return
and if exit is costly, the owners will suffer losses relative to what they
could have earned elsewhere. Thus, one can pose the issue of unan-
ticipated competition in the following way: Suppose that investors,
when they decide to enter an industry, anticipate that all competitors
will be for-profit firms. When many of the competitors turn out to be
nonprofits, under what conditions should we expect the investors to
earn "subcompetitive" returns?
In the absence of conscious predatory behavior, the only way
nonprofits can affect for-profits is through "excessive" entry. That is,
because of the tax treatment of nonprofits and the costs of exit, the
industry has more firms, earning lower gross returns, than the for-
profit investors expected ex ante. To show how "excessive" entry can
occur, suppose that nonprofit entrepreneurial activity is concentrated
in a single industry and that the nonprofit sector is small relative to
corporate profits tax can be viewed as a lump-sum tax on corporations so long as the personal
tax rate on bond interest exceeds the corporate rate. See Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporation Rt'ancial
Poliy and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PUB. ECON 1 (1973). This result depends on features of the
tax law Harberger does not consider-that is, "on the interest deductibility provisions and on
the fact that capital gains are taxed only upon realization." Id at 33. If interest payments
are not deductible, and if depreciation allowances equal true depreciation, then the tax is
distortionary and capital flows from the taxed to the untaxed sector. King notes that "[t]his is
similar to the conclusions of Harberger's (1962) model except that in our case equilibrium is
determined by marginal and not average rates of return." King, Taxation, Corporate Financial
Poliy, and the Cost of Capita. A Comment, 4 J. PUB. EOoN. 271, 276 (1975). Stiglitz pulls to-
gether and extends the discussion by viewing the tax in turn as "a tax on capital in the
corporate sector, a tax on entrepreneurship in the corporate sector, a tax on pure profits in the
corporate sector, and a tax on risk taking." Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PUB. EcON. 303,
303 (1976).
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the economy as a whole. Therefore, the sector's investment decisions
have no noticeable effect on overall market rates of return. I shall
also make the realistic assumption that, despite the tax avoidance
potential of 100% debt financing, profit-maximizing taxable firms
will have capital structures that mix debt and equity.
3
'
Given these assumptions, we can derive the formal conditions
under which nonprofit entry can depress for-profit returns below
competitive levels.32 Basically, "excessive" entry occurs when non-
31. Taxable firms can deduct interest paid on debt, but all returns to equity are taxed.
Given this fact, for-profit firms might avoid taxes on profits by relying entirely on bonds to
raise capital. If firms were 100% debt financed, the corporate income tax would be a tax on
the pure or "economic" profits of inframarginal firms. See note 28 supra. The tax would not
affect any firm's marginal choices, and hence firms would not care about the tax status of
their competitors. In a competitive world, the marginal firms earn no excess "economic"
profits, and hence the tax treatment of profits would be irrelevant. For-profit firms would be
indifferent to the tax status of their competitors, and no issue of "unfair" competition would
arise.
Despite these tax incentives, for-profits do not rely solely on debt for their capital re-
quirements. There appear to be several reasons for this, one of which is the IRS's disfavor for
100% debt financing. See B. BrrrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 783-785
(5th ed. 1980). In addition, the more highly leveraged a firm is, the more likely are lenders to
require higher rates on loans. These higher rates reflect the practical difficulties of monitor-
ing managers and the increased likelihood of bankruptcy as the ratio of loans to equity in-
creases. Therefore, a for-profit firm faces a cost of capital that depends on its capital structure
and may well prefer a mixture of debt and equity in spite of the tax advantages of debt.
Modigliani and Miller initiated the current literature on firm capital structure. See Mo-
digliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM.
EcoN. REv. 261 (1958) (arguing that in a competitive world, with perfect capital markets, no
taxes and no risk of bankruptcy, the capital structure of a firm has no effect on its value).
Their article was followed by numerous attempts to develop alternative models, including
models stressing monitoring and agency costs. See e.g., Stiglitz, Some aspects of the pure theog of
corporate finance: bankruptcies andtake-overs, 3 BELLJ. ECON. &MGMT. SCd. 458 (1972); Jensen &
Meckling, Theo,7 of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agenmy Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976); Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977); Ross,
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23
(1977).
Miller, however, argues both that bankruptcy costs and agency costs are small and that
the tax advantages of debt have been overrated. Miller, Debt and Taxe, 32 J. FIN. 261, 263-64
(1977). He further argues that equity investments are beneficial to high bracket taxpayers
since capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than bond interest payments, and that this fact
will be reflected in the market returns to bonds and stocks. Id at 266-68. Thus, the tax laws
will determine the debt-equity ratio for the economy as a whole, but there is no optimum
ratio for any individual firm. Id at 269. This result, of course, depends upon the assumption
of insignificant bankruptcy and agency costs so that lenders are indifferent to the debt-equity
ratios of individual firms.
32. Suppose that individual investors all have the same preferences toward risk, and
that capital markets are competitive with market rates set so that individual investors are
indifferent between bonds and stocks. To characterize this fact, suppose that there is a riskless
asset which earns an after-tax rate of return of v and that all risky assets have nominal or
expected returns set so that they are equivalent to a certainty of v. To avoid unnecessary
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profits have excess cash to invest and the return they can obtain by
lending their money on the bond market is lower than the rate of
return on active, entrepreneurial investmentsY3  This will often be
the case under my assumptions if the corporate tax rate exceeds the
tax rate on individual income and if capital gains taxes are low. Non-
profits will continue to enter until their presence drives down indus-
try returns to the point where marginal nonprofits are indifferent
between passive and active investments. When that happens, margi-
nal for-profits will want to leave the industry because they will be
earning "subcompetitive" returns that are less than the market re-
turn on riskless assets. Because of the costs of exit, those firms will
earn less than market returns whether they stay in business, go bank-
rupt, or sell out.34
complications, assume that firms issue no dividends, that the personal income tax rate on
bond interest is s, that capital gains are untaxed, and that the corporate tax rate is t. This
means that the nominal rate on bonds is r where r = v/(l-s) and that the gross profit rate is w
where w = v/O-t).
Suppose, further, that a nonprofit has some excess cash to invest. Since its interest earn-
ings are tax-exempt, the nonprofit can earn the equivalent of r if it invests in the bonds of
other firms. If it operates a tax-exempt business itself, it will earn w so long as the nonprofit
believes that it will be just as efficient as the marginal for-profit.
Thus, in this simple case, it will establish a new business if w is greater than r, that is, if t
exceeds s. When this condition holds, the nonprofit obtains tax benefits from either type of
investment, but the benefits are greater for productive or "active" investments. If there are
many nonprofits in this same situation, they will enter the industry until the marginal non-
profit earns r from its productive investment. At that point, many for-profit firms may want
to leave the industry. Any firm that earned a pretax return of w before the entry of nonprof-
its is now earning r, which is less than w when t is greater than s.
33. If nonprofits were taxed on all productive "business" activities but not on passive
investments, then in equilibrium nonprofits would compare the rate of return on active in-
vestments with the rate for a hypothetical risk-free investment. If we assume that they can
earn no more than the marginal for-profit in an active investment, then nonprofits would
only invest in bonds since they would still be tax-exempt. (I assume throughout that nonprof-
its are such a small force in the bond market that the rate of return is unaffected by their
choice.)
Students of public finance may wonder how this rather large change in behavior can be
consistent with Stiglitz's claim that, under certain conditions, the corporate income tax does
not affect investment choices. See A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLrrZ, supra note 14, at 142-46;
Stiglitz, supra note 30, at 32. Stiglitz considers a case with no bankruptcy risks, where margi-
nal investments are financed by borrowing, interest payments are deductible, and true eco-
nomic depreciation is deducted to compute tax liability. Then, the firm's marginal
investment decisions will remain unchanged whether or not it is subject to the corporate
income tax. Furthermore, if the depreciation allowance exceeds economic depreciation, the
tax system may actually encourage investment. This result, however, refers only to the margi-
nal behavior of existing firms. Stiglitz assumes competitive markets and does not deal explic-
itly with entry and exit. Thus, while the marginal choices of nonprofits may well be
unaffected, they will seek to make a discontinuous change and exit from the industry if their
profits become taxable.
34. In the case discussed in text, the nonprofits' impact on for-profits turns on the asym-
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The importance of this conclusion depends, first, on the concen-
tration of nonprofit investments in particular industries; second, on
the number of marginal for-profit firms in any industry earning only
competitive returns; and third, on the assumption that nonprofits
have excess cash available for investment. If the productive activities
of nonprofits are broadly diffused, there will be little impact on prof-
its anywhere in the economy. In fact, if tax-exempt firms have no
special efficiency advantages in any industry, one would expect them
to seek to maximize returns by establishing firms in a broad range of
industries, thus earning close to a competitive return in each one.
Since nonprofits control only a small proportion of the economy's
resources,35 one would not expect them to be able to push returns
down much below ordinary competitive rates if their funds were
evenly spread across the economy. Further, if most for-profit firms
are more than marginally profitable, few firms will want to exit from
industries which nonprofits enter, although all will earn somewhat
less than they did before the entry of nonprofits.
Finally, if the nonprofits must borrow funds from banks or other
lenders, the cost of capital may be too high to make active entrepre-
neurship worthwhile, even if the corporate tax rate exceeds the indi-
vidual rate. Nonprofits might, for example, be charged rates that
exceed competitive returns because lenders have difficulty monitor-
ing the nonprofits' behavior.36 Nonprofit managers must then decide
whether to use a combination of gifts and loans to start new busi-
nesses, taking into account that nonprofits cannot enjoy the tax ad-
vantages of debt that accrue to for-profits. The smaller the pool of
internal funds available to the nonprofit, the higher the rate of inter-
est charged, and the larger the efficient scale in the industry, the less
likely it is that active nonprofit entry will occur. Indeed, if the cost of
borrowing is high enough, entry may only occur if the nonprofit is
metric tax treatment of bonds and stocks, not on the nonprofits' tax advantages per se. Sup-
pose, for example, that nonprofits faced the same tax rate on both bonds and stock. Then
they would also favor direct investment over bond purchase so long as t is greater than s for
other investors. See note 32, supra.
35. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofd Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 835 n.1 (1980)
(estimating that the nonprofit sector accounted for about 2.8% of national income in 1974).
36. This could happen if leuders believe that nonprofit organizations are particularly
untrustworthy users of investment funds. Lenders might prefer to lend to entrepreneurs with
some direct ownership interest in the enterprise who will benefit financially if returns are
high. See Jenson & Meckling, supra note 31. Compare this supposition about the relative
untrustworthiness of nonprofits as borrowers with the argument that nonprofits may be seen
as more trustworthy than for-profits by donors and consumers. See Hansmann, supra note 35.
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more efficient than existing marginal for-profits.3 7 But in that case, if
some for-profits were eventually driven out of business, there would
be a net efficiency gain.38
Of course, there is no reason to believe that a nonprofit's capital
structure disadvantages just match its tax advantages. Efficient for-
profits may suffer losses if the entry of nonprofits is concentrated in
their industry, or efficient nonprofits may fail to enter because they
are unable to obtain adequate and affordable capital. If, as I have
assumed, efficiency is not systematically associated with organiza-
tional form, then the form that is most favored by the tax system and
the capital market in a particular situation would be able to exploit
whatever opportunities arise. It is therefore possible that some effi-
cient for-profit entrepreneurs and investors will earn subnormal re-
turns if nonprofit entry is concentrated in a few industries. The
extent of loss cannot categorically be affirmed or denied; it is an em-
pirical issue to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
C. Oligopoly
The impact of tax-exempt firms on their taxable competitors can
be quite different if an industry is oligopolistic rather than competi-
tive. 9 I shall show that the claims of for-profit firms to suffer "harm"
may well be valid in an oligopoly with a fixed number of firms.
1. Effict of nonprofit status on outut.
In an oligopolistic market, a firm's tax status may affect its margi-
nal choices, and a tax-exempt firm may have a higher output and a
larger effect on market price than a tax-paying firm.4' To see how
this can happen, consider a simple duopoly model in which a for-
37. Tax disadvantaged firms, see note 34 sufira, would be unable to borrow at all unless
they were markedly more efficient than ordinary for-profit firms.
38. If as Hansmann, supra note 15, supposes, nonprofit firms are inefficiently capital
constrained because of their inability to raise equity capital, then the likelihood that their for-
profit competitors will earn subnormal returns is low so long as the two organizational forms
are equally efficient.
39. The authors in Note, Preventing UntaredBudness,supra note 18, never go beyond com-
petitive assumptions. Klein, sura note 11, at 61-66, uses an oligopoly model in which firms
do not behave strategically. An oligopoly model is also implicit in Note, Colleges, Charities, and
the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 3, at 876, while competitive assumptions are implicit in
Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 1, at 1281.
40. These issues did not arise in Part I-B because the firms were in a competitive indus-
try. No individual firm could affect the performance of the industry by its choice of output
level or price. In an oligopolistic industry this is no longer true. The essence of an oligopolis-
tic industry is the close link between the behavior of one firm and the performance of another.
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profit firm A, faces a single competitor B, which may be either a tax-
exempt nonprofit financed by gifts and debt or a taxable for-profit.
Assume, first, that there is no risk of bankruptcy and that lenders
require the same minimum rate of return on both bonds and stocks.41
Lenders require for-profit firms to maintain a ratio of debt to total
capital below a specified level, and all firms purchase debt at a fixed
rate that is independent of the debt-equity ratio and the level of pri-
vate giving to nonprofits.42
Whatever its tax status, firm B produces the quantity that maxi-
mizes profits by equating the marginal revenue gain from an increase
in output (after tax for the for-profit firm) with the sum of the margi-
nal increases in operating costs and capital costs from the same in-
crease in output (again, after tax for the for-profit firm). Firm B's
profit-maximizing output will depend on its tax status if the tax af-
fects its marginal decisions. This is true under the current system
which taxes "accounting" rather than "economic" profits. That is,
the tax is levied only on the return to equity, not on capital costs that
take the form of interest on debt. 3 So long as some of its marginal
capital cost is raised through stock issues, then, it costs the for-profit
more to expand production than it does a comparable nonprofit. At
the level of output that maximizes net profits for the for-profit, mar-
ginal revenues would exceed marginal costs for the nonprofit. There-
fore, as long as marginal revenue falls with increases in output and
marginal operating and capital costs increase or remain constant, the
nonprofit will choose a higher level of output than the similarly situ-
ated for-profit.'
41. I thus abstract from differences in the tax treatment of these individual investments
as well as from the relative riskiness of different types of investments.
42. I later consider the risks of bankruptcy and default. See text accompanying notes
48-53 infra.
43. To an economist, one of the costs of doing business is to provide a "normal" rate of
return to invested capital, equal to what could be earned in alternative investments. "Eco-
nomic" profits are measured as the excess of revenues over these and other costs. See note 28
,rsua.
44. If the corporate tax were levied on "economic" profits, firm B's tax status and capi-
tal structure would be irrelevant, and firm A would be indifferent to the tax status of its
competitor. It may look with envy at the higher profits of the tax-exempt firm, but these
profits have no effect on its own performance.
To see this, suppose that firm B acts like a Cournot oligopolist. In other words, B maxi-
mizes profits holding the quantity A produces constant. See J. HENDERSON & R. QuANr,
MIcRoEcoNoMIc THEoRY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 222-31 (1971).
Let B's profits, rIB, be
rib = [p(q)qB- CqB)](1-t) (I)
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2. Impact on for-profit competitors.
We are now ready to ask how the for-profit firm, A, is affected by
the organizational and tax status of its competitor, B. Suppose, for
where p = price,
qA = quantity produced by A,
qB = quantity produced by B,
q = q, + qB,
c(qB) = total cost of producing qB,
t = corporate tax rate.
Then, if the second order conditions hold, B's profits are maximized at:
dI
dq (-t) [p'(q) qB + P - c'(qB)] = 0 (2)
In a Cournot model, p'(q) = dq since firm B takes A's output as given. Clearly, the level of
qB that solves (2) does not depend upon B's tax rate. Firm A does not care about the tax
status of its competitor. See Klein, sufira note 11, at 63 (presenting a simple preliminary
model); Note, Preventing Untaxed Business, supra note 18, at 591-92.
In contrast, when the tax is levied on "accounting" profits, a firm's tax status can affect
its behavior. Then in long-run steady state equilibrium, "economic" profits are:
IIB = (1-t) [p(q) qB - e(qB) - rB(qB)] - rE(qB), (3)
where c(qB) = operating costs,
r = interest rate,
B(qB) = dollar value of capital raised by sales of bonds,
E(qB) = dollar value of other capital from equity or gifts.
Let K(qB) = dollar value of capital, let 3 equal the ratio of debt to total capital required by
those who lend to for-profits, and let gifts equal some fixed dollar amount, G. (I do not
analyze the general strategic question of the trade-off between debt financing and the genera-
tion of private donations.) We can now ask how a competitor will act if, on the one hand, it is
a for-profit with t > 0, 3 < 1, B(qB) = P3K(qB) and E(qB) = (1-3)K(qB), or, on the other
hand, a nonprofit with B(qB) = K(qB) - G, and E(qB) = 0. Capital raised through gifts has
the same opportunity cost as equity capital since it can be invested at rate r. Thus, for the
taxable for-profit firm:
II' = (1-t) [p(q) qB - 8(qB)- rp3K(qB)] - r(1-3)K(qB)- (4)
For the nonprofit:
r12 = p(q) qB - 8(qB) - rK(qB)- (5)
Maximizing 11 and II with respect to qB, and assuming the second order conditions hold,
yields for the for-profit;
0 = (1-t) [p'(q) q B + p - Y'(qB). - P3rK'(qB)] - r(I-3) K'(qB), (6)
and for the nonprofit;
0 = p'(q) qB + P - '(qB) - rK'(qB). (7)
In the short run, if capital is fixed so K'(qB) = 0, both types of competitors make the same
profit maximizing output choices. If, instead, capital can be varied, the nonprofit will pro-
duce more output. To see this, suppose that each firm produces the same output. But then
-t (p'qB + P - c'(qB) - P3rK'(qB)) would have to equal zero. Substituting from (7), this
implies that -t(1-13) rK'(qB) = 0. But this is impossible so long as the marginal product of
capital is positive. Thus, in general, when (7) is solved for qB so that the nonprofit is maxi-
mizing net returns, the for-profit has marginal after-tax costs that exceed marginal revenues.
So long as marginal costs increase (or remain constant) with q, and marginal revenues fall,
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concreteness, that both firms behave as Cournot oligopolists. 45 That
is, each one maximizes profits assuming that the output of its rival
remains constant. We can then draw reaction functions46 *,a and *k&
that show how firms A and B, respectively, will respond to the output
choices of the other firm. Thus qIA shows the profit-maximizing out-










Figure 1 illustrates a possible set of reaction functions where q4 is
A's output and qB is B's output. They have been drawn as straight
lines, but all we really know is that they are downward sloping.47 We
established above that, ceterisparibus, B produces more when it is tax-
exempt than when it is taxable. Thus, the reaction function of the
tax-exempt firm, ql , is everywhere above that of the taxable firm, 2;,
except when qB = 0. Since, under the Cournot model, the reaction
function for A is unaffected by B's tax and organizational status, the
equilibrium level of qs is higher and that of qCA is lower when B is
the level of output chosen by the nonprofit is too large for the for-profit. Therefore, firm A is
better off if its competitor is a for-profit firm.
The basic idea of this modeling exercise is that nonprofits set marginal revenue (MR)
equal to marginal variable cost (MVC) plus marginal capital cost (MK-), while for-profits
set (I-t)MR equal to (I-t)MVC + (I-p3t)MKC. Since 3 < 1, (1-t) is smaller than (1-[t).
Thus MR-MVC is larger than MKC at the taxable firm's profit-maximizing output.
45. See J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, .sura note 44, at 222-28.
46. See id at 226 (explaining reaction functions).
47. The lines slope downward because firm A maximizes profits at a lower level of out-
put the higher the output of firm B, and vice versa. See id at 222-28.
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tax-exempt. A is unambiguously worse off when its competitor is a
tax-exempt nonprofit.
3. Importance of bankruptg risk.
But this simple model overstates the injury that a nonprofit can
impose on a for-profit. To proceed further, we should take account
of the possibility of bankruptcy and default. In general, the interest
rate lenders can charge is not fixed for all borrowers. Lenders charge
highly leveraged firms higher rates to compensate for their increased
risks of bankruptcy.48 Unless nonprofits are very well endowed or
have superior access to donations, they must finance themselves with
debt. The risk of bankruptcy may therefore be lower for for-profits
since they are partially financed by equity investments. This may
make for-profit firms more effective competitors because they have
superior access to capital funds. The advantages of the for-profit's
capital structure and the risk-sharing feature of the corporate income
tax4 9 may outweigh the for-profit's tax disadvantages. As a conse-
quence, the nonprofit may produce less output than a for-profit be-
cause the nonprofit is either rationed in the capital market,50 or
charged high rates by lenders. A may nowprefer to face a nonprofit
competitor.5
When bankruptcy is possible, firm managers and shareholders
will be concerned not only with expected return but also with risk.
In a duopoly or oligopoly, management would therefore be con-
cerned both with its own absolute level of resources and with its vul-
nerability to bankruptcy relative to other firms in the industry: Cetert
paribus, a firm's risk of bankruptcy is negatively related to its compet-
itors' risks. To see this, one need only recognize that if demand is
unexpectedly low, everyone faces a heightened risk of bankruptcy,
but a firm's risk is lower if there are other firms that are more margi-
48. The risk is higher because more of the firm's debt takes the form of fixed rate securi-
ties that must be repaid so long as any excess over operating costs is available. With equity
investment, a firm's owners and managers have more freedom to decide how much income to
pay out in dividends and how much to retain for investment and as a hedge against losses.
49. ee Gordon, Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenue v. Tax Distor-
tions (1981) (unpublished manuscript, Bell Laboratories) (stressing the risk-spreading benefits
of the corporate income tax); Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 303, 307-08 (1976)
(same).
50. Ste D. JAFFEE, CREDIT RATIONING AND THE COMMERCIAL LOAN MARKET (1971)
(attempting to explain why lenders may ration credit rather than raising interest rates); Jaffee
& Russell, Imperfct Information, Unertain, and Credit Rationing, 90 Q. J. EcoN. 651 (1976)
(same).
51. In Figure 1, the positions of qB and qB would be reversed.
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nal than it is. Marginal firms, with the smallest cushion of past prof-
its, will exit first, thus pushing up prices and improving market
conditions for those that remain.
In this regard, for-profits frequently claim that nonprofits are less
likely to go bankrupt than for-profits. Since exit normally implies a
loss of wealth and outside sources of capital are not always available
to tide a firm over bad years, retained earnings can be an important
factor in a firm's survival. Because of their exemption from the cor-
porate income tax, nonprofits are believed to accumulate more earn-
ings in good years to cover losses in subsequent years. If this claim is
correct, the relative immunity of nonprofits makes their for-profit
competitors relatively more vulnerable to bankruptcy. The truth of
this claim, however, depends on the availability of loss carryovers in
the tax law. If there is full carryover, a firm is never taxed unless it
actually earns profits over time. Thus, whether the nonprofit firm
has an advantage in the bankruptcy context turns on the existence
and completeness of loss carryovers, not on the corporate tax exemp-
tion alone. In fact, although loss carryover provisions are not com-
plete, they are quite generous-losses generally can be carried back
three years and forward fifteen years. 2 When profits oscillate from
positive to negative as time passes, a taxable firm is treated almost
like a tax-exempt firm on any gains which are balanced by losses in
other years. For-profits will only be disadvantaged when they have a
run of losses that lasts more than eighteen years with major losses in
the middle of the period-more than three years after the last profit
in the past and more than fifteen years before the first profit in fu-
ture. 3 In short, nonprofits' lower risk of bankruptcy has been over-
emphasized by their for-profit competitors. Current tax law treats
the two organizational forms almost identically.
In conclusion, a for-profit oligopolist would prefer to compete
with another for-profit whenever nonprofits have no special difficul-
ties obtaining capital and corporate loss carryover provisions are in-
52. I.R.C. § 172(b) (West Supp. 1982).
53. In an inflationary world, loss carryforwards are less valuable than loss carrybacks
unless they are somehow indexed to take account of price changes.
In addition to the loss carryover provisions, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
provides another benefit to loss-making corporations. The "safe harbor lease" provision of
the Act allows them to sell their unused investment tax credits by engaging in sale-leaseback
arrangements with business organizations in high marginal tax brackets. See Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981, § 201(a), I.R.C. § 168(o)(8) (West Supp. 1982). Tax-exempt nonprof-
its are not eligible to participate since the law requires that both sides of the transaction be
eligible to receive the investment tax credit. The only exception is for mass transportation
vehicles, id, a clause designed to benefit cities with large mass transit systems.
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complete. But the for-profit will prefer a nonprofit competitor
whenever nonprofits have difficulty raising capital, and are therefore
small and ineffective competitors.54 Once again, while "harm" is
possible, its extent depends upon a set of factual conditions deter-
mined by the details of the tax law and the operation of the capital
market.
II. "UNFAIR COMPETITION" AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
I have isolated two very different market structures under which
for-profit investors may suffer from the presence of nonprofit compe-
tition. Each situation requires a different policy analysis. One com-
plaint of unfair competition is easy to dismiss; the other forces us to
confront some hard questions of economic justice.
The claims of unfair competition raised by oligopolists should not
be taken seriously. American antitrust and regulatory policy makes
it clear that there is no public commitment to the maintenance of
profits resulting from economic concentration. If successful antitrust
litigation forces .a cartel to disband, or an oligopolist to divest an ac-
quisition, private investors cannot obtain compensation for their loss
of monopoly profits. 55 -Similarly, firms should not be entitled to spe-
cial protection when the .production decisions of nonprofits lower
their oligopoly returns.
A harder case arises when investors are deprived of competitive
54. However, in many areas where competition is most brisk, nonprofits cannot be
viewed as capital constrained. A fairly common pattern is competition between nonprofits
that are "subsidiaries" of large, wealthy tax-exempt organizations such as universities, muse-
ums, or churches, and'for-profit firms that are small corporations with little or no access to
national capital markets. This pattern is common in research and residential care for the
retarded or mentally ill.
These cases stand in contrast to nursing homes, hospitals and publishing houses, where
for-profits are frequently organized into chains or are part of larger corporations. Organized
child day care services with a mix of chains, small independent for-profits and nonprofits, and
non-profits affiliated with churches and universities are intermediate cases. See C. COELEN, F.
GLANT r & D. CALORE, DAY CARE CENTERS IN THE U.S. 3, 83 (1979). Therefore, the for-
profit firms that are most likely to complain about "unfair" competition will be those that
both face the affiliates of well-endowed institutions and are themselves rationed in the capital
market. In fact, this does seem to be the case. The major cases in this area involve travel
agents and a testing laboratory. See Kaplan, supra note 2; T. Spiro, .supra note 20.
55. The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act both seek to penalize firms which monopo-
lize industries. Instead of compensation, violators may be subject to fins and triple damages
awards. See F. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 494-495.
The debate in antitrust policy over controlling market structure versus controlling be-
havior suggests that an active policy to reduce monopoly profits wherever they occur would
be controversial. This debate does not imply, however, a public commitment to preserving
monopoly returns.
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returns by the unanticipated entry of nonprofits. It is true that inves-
tors in a capitalist economy do not imagine they are guaranteed a
competitive return by the government: Tastes may change, competi-
tors may develop new technology, and so forth. But when competi-
tive losses can be traced to particular government actions, the state
has a special responsibility to justify its conduct. 6 Thus, the fifth
amendment requires compensation if the government confiscates pri-
vate property.5 7 Of course, nothing so extreme is in question here.
Rather than seizing firm assets, the government is "merely" manipu-
lating the business environment to the advantage of nonprofit firms.
Furthermore, it will never be entirely clear how much of the inves-
tor's losses are due to the tax-exempt status of some competitors and
how much is due to other causes. On the level of constitutional the-
ory, it is not clear what difference the "indirect" character of the
government's taking ought to make in assessing the firms' right to
compensation. 8 Whatever the theory, however, the case law plainly
suggests that contemporary courts would refuse to extend the fifth
amendment to cover tax-related claims of "unfair competition." 59
Courts, however, are not the only institutions concerned with un-
fair governmental manipulation of the business environment. As the
current tax law indicates, Congress itself has chosen to restrict non-
profits in the name of fairness. But the tax on "unrelated" business
income is exactly the wrong way to respond to the problem. The
56. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 145-50 (1977); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 456-65 (1978); Michelman, Propery, Utiliy and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 7yust Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967).
Graetz, Legal Tra'zitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 47 (1977), discusses the issue in the context of changes in the income tax law, but he fails
to note the relationship between losses caused by tax law changes and unconstitutional tak-
ings of property. Instead he assumes "that any tax law changes considered here do not
amount to 'takings."' Id at 64 n.54. He then goes on to present a range of arguments for
and against grandfathering. Although "firm conclusions are difficult," he wishes to make the
tax law "flexible" and argues that "[p]eople should make investments with the expectation
that political policies may change." Id at 87. On the similarities between taxation and tak-
ings, see Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theo,7, in NoMos XXII, PROPERTY 351, 362 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 56, at 116-118, 133-35;
L. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 459-63; Michelman, supra note 56.
58. Michelman argues that a utilitarian policymaker would require compensation to be
paid only if the public measure "can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant
of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation."
Michelman, supra note 56, at 1233. For a broader view of the takings clause, see B. ACKER-
MAN, supra note 56.
59. See Alco Parking Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 417 U.S. 369 (1974) (tax designed to
harm competitive position of for-profit firms does not constitute a taking).
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nonprofit sector is, after all, rather small relative to the economy as a
whole.6 ° If the sector's productive business investments were spread
across the economy, they would be unlikely to have much competi-
tive impact.61 But the tax on "unrelated" business income prevents
such dispersion. Tax-exempt firms must now concentrate their profit-
able endeavors in those few lines of business judged to be "related."
For example, the growth of gift shops and vacation tours operated or
sponsored by nonprofit organizations may be, in part, a response to
the conditions of the tax law.62 Such concentration in a few areas
makes it much more likely that the business activities of nonprofits
will impose losses on competitive for-profit firms. Of course, these
losses were only unanticipated by firms that were in the industry at
the time of the substantial entry of nonprofits. But since the IRS and
the courts continue to modify the definition of "unrelated," the stat-
ute probably continues to impose new windfall gains and losses on
competing for-profit corporations as well as on nonprofits that rely
on superseded rulings.63
It appears, then, that the tax on unrelated business activity cre-
ates more unfairness than it can possibly prevent. It should therefore
be repealed. It is less clear what, if anything, should be put in its
place. If the IRS is to pinpoint instances of "unfair" competition, it
would have to carry out an economic analysis that hinges on difficult
issues of market structure. Nonprofits might be given the right to
enter any business subject to a finding by the IRS that further entry is
likely to depress for-profit returns below competitive levels. Regula-
tions explicating this standard would emphasize three factors-the
prevailing rate of return in the industry, the speed and volume of
nonprofit entry, and the costs of exit for for-profit firms. As similar
inquiries in antitrust and public utility regulation suggest, this will
often require the use of a great deal of discretion.' Nevertheless, the
60. See note 35 supra.
61. See Klein, supra note 11, at 63-64 n.212. If a nonprofit should obtain control of a
large firm in some industry, it would be likely to do no more than limit monopoly profits in
that industry.
62. T. Spiro, sufira note 20, details the legal challenges of for-profit providers in these
industries.
63. Se Cooper, supra note 3; Greenbaum, supira note 6; Kaplan, supra note 2; Webster,
supra note 4. For example, the IRS currently appears to be tightening the definition of "unre-
lated" at least with respect to universities. See Bromberg, supra note 5.
64. In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the Supreme'Court held that a public
utility is entitled to a fair return on the value of its investment. It refused, however, to indi-
cate precisely the economic meaning of its standard, saying "[blow such compensation may
be ascertained, and what are the necessary elements in such an inquiry, will always be an
embarassing question." I at 546. This standard was replaced in the 1940s by a standard
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principles are clear: First, firms earning supercompetitive profits
have no right to protection from "unfair" competition.6 5 It is only
when this first principle is satisfied that a second issue should be
reached. Here, the IRS would determine whether nonprofits are en-
tering at a rate that could have a substantial impact on for-profit
returns. Finally, the IRS would have to be convinced that the exit
costs of for-profits will be substantial. Once again, the use of discre-
tion is inevitable-but the existence of very specialized human and
physical capital would be the focus of concern.
A successful showing of unfair competition would be rare under
these guidelines. Indeed, the process seems so cumbersome, and the
gains in fairness so elusive, that a simple repeal of the present tax on
unrelated income seems the better alternative. By permitting non-
profits to enter any profitmaking industry, repeal will reduce the
pressure on for-profit firms in areas that are "related" to the primary
activities of nonprofits. While this new freedom may increase the
overall level of nonprofit entrepreneurial activity,66 the dfffusion of
this activity throughout the economy reduces the chance that inves-
tors in a particular industry will suffer substantial unanticipated
losses from nonprofit entry.
that asked whether "the total effect of the rate order [is] unjust and unreasonable." Federal
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). Tribe notes that this is a
test which "only the most egregiously confiscatory rate structure would have difficulty meet-
ing." L. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 461 n.3 (1978).
65. This is the implication of the antitrust laws and of rate of return regulation for
public utilities. See F. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 475-94; note 55 supra.
66. The increase will be larger if nonprofits are permitted to borrow to finance these
investments. Currently, nonprofits can invest in real estate without paying taxes on their
earnings, but they are not permitted to borrow to finance these investments. See Bittker &
Rahdert, supira note 3, at 322-25. If, in fact, tax-exempt firms took advantage of their
favorable tax position to engage in arbitrage so that a major share of the economy's invest-
ment funds passed through their organizations, then the hands-off policy recommended in the
text would have to be re-examined. However, since lenders do not lend at favorable rates to
highly leveraged firms, such arbitrage is unlikely given the limited resources available to tax-
exempt firms from private donations.
67. Current changes in the depreciation allowances permitted for tax purposes, see Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 201, I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982), will reduce the
taxes of most corporations. This tax reduction will work against any expansion of nonprofit
investments in competitive markets by reducing the tax advantages of debt. It is no longer so
likely that nonprofits will find that productive investments will dominate the purchase of
bonds for purely tax reasons.
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